emerge among people who interacted repeatedly with one another in the absence of anything like a state. After all, the folk theorem for repeated games suggests that is a possible equilibrium. But in reality societies that have no state are violent, with death rates from warfare that dwarf casuSteven Pinker, war slaughtered an average of 524 people each year, for -a civil war in Russia, and the devastation of two violent World Wars (Pinker 2011, pp. 52-53) . Beyond security, money, and the rule of law, states (or local governsewage treatment, and other goods and services that are either public or sewers not only wiped out typhoid, but it also greatly reduced deaths caused by other ailments (such as heart disease, kidney failure, and respilarge impact in Britain and France as well (Kesztenbaum and Rosenthal -ments) have also built roads, canals and ports, and operated rail lines and subsidized housing, and insurance against disability or unemployment, and in addition to all this social spending, they pay for most fundamental 1 outcomes, we still know too little about what determines the laws, regulation, and policies that states adopt or what goods and services they -plored, and the politics itself is rarely laid bare, particularly if we leave the United States and consider the history of other parts of the world. Nor over time.
and local governments spent money on are frequently unavailable (again, this is particularly true outside the United States), even though a bit of historical research could gather the necessary numbers. But the problem, as Stephan R. Epstein argued, was that states were often too before the nineteenth century; Britain alone had a powerful state thanks to political innovations during and after the Glorious Revolution. It was today, or so ongoing work in political economy maintains (Besley and Persson 2010 right up into the twentieth century, and the rebels could make claims to 4 poor suburbs of French cities, where at least some young men seem to 5 resources and (at the very least) popular acquiescence, both of which -look the centuries of work that states did both to acquire resources and to win people over so that the cost of ruling (including the political risks have an effective monopoly over its use. Second, it can levy substantial -tion to being able to use force they also gain the capacity to impose and emergencies but for the foreseeable future. assent of the population. Once the state is established, they could gather was favored, and how the responsibilities were divided up between the central and local government. Surprisingly, data of that sort is still not readily available, particularly outside the United States. For much of 4 Cambridge History of China that covers the nineteenth century (Fairbank 1978) .
5
For poor young men who rioted in the French suburbs in 2005, violence was a legitimate way overall, the neighborhood of Englewood, on the South Side, has a murder rate (74 per 100,000 people in the 12 months ending 27 July 2014, according to data downloaded 2 August 2014, at http://crime.chicagotribune.com/chicago/community/west-englewood) that would put it among the ten most dangerous municipalities in the world in 2013 if it were itself a city. Most of the murders there are committed by young men-often gang members-who see violence as a legitimate way to retaliate, get their way, or defend themselves against threats that the police seem unable to stop, at least without effective gun control. nineteenth-century Europe, for instance, data on categories of spending easily accessed. It is being gathered, but much more remains to be done, especially for Asia and Latin America and for local spending everywhere. 6 And the situation is even worse-though not hopeless-before the nineteenth century.
economic historians have long done-but even more important, it will particularly for the United States, and, for other economies, for social spending. see Poole and Rosenthal (2001) , and Rosenthal and Voeten (2004 By itself, therefore, warfare is not enough to create a state. It may help lead to a correlation between warfare and state formation. But the warfare always give birth to states. Something else in addition to warfare must -and the public good of security, although other public goods (such as providing money with a stable value that would obviate the need for barter But the whole process was also inseparable from politics, and the politics 10 Medieval rulers did collect revenue from tolls, mints, and from their own personal possessions, 11 eleventh century, the rate was 1,140 deaths per 100,000 ruler years, which Eisner compares to a death rate in heavy combat today of roughly 600 deaths per 100,000 person years and the ruler years.
(so we shall see) was essential to making the leap from warfare to state formation. French kings, for instance, gained the right to impose sizeable permathe kings of England to see who would rule France.
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But the French monarchs did not obtain that right immediately. Initially, they could levy had been released would then plunder the countryside, leaving a trail of death, refugees, and smoking ruins.
Stopping these brigands had wide support, but when it came to pay for the effort, people dug in their heels. Suppressing the brigandage -revenue from a corner of the kingdom where furloughed soldiers posed -war time to regions that were in danger.
in 1356, when their King, John II, was taken prisoner by the English.
willing to grant a peacetime levy to pay his ransom, and his son, who -taking two critical actions. First, he fashioned a political coalition in favor second, he showed that he would use the money to wipe out the brigands.
to provide the precious public good of security. But his success was not assemblies, and a kingdom wide representative assembly in 1356 did not 12 288) would behave-whether they too would contribute and whether the good, and while one might have doubts that results obtained with student it clear that the outcomes are path dependent and shaped by past behavior. strategy if they were concerned only about their own monetary pay offpayoff, that they dislike it when others free ride, and-most important of all-that they try out and evaluate strategies based on the recent history of play. If past play convinces them that others will contribute and that all 13 If the same rules governed behavior by those with a political voice in out the brigandage and reaching agreements with local elites, the future would in fact contribute, that the public good of security would in fact be the French kings might have had to wait much longer to get permanent for other polities took a very different route. In Brandenburg Prussia, force played a role, but a political bargain with elites was still essential. BC), whose leaders BC-AD a bureaucracy that increased the resources the state could muster and at the same time had the important long run political effect of keeping elites loyal by drawing them into state service. 14 -decades or more without ever being able to levy substantial permanent the obstacles to establishing states: among them organizations that can provide substitutes for the public goods or services a state furnishes and so reduce that appeal of creating a state to provide them. At the end of famine and disaster relief that today would be the task of states (Brown had become a substitute for a state in a world without one. 15 Similarly, local authorities (a lord in medieval Europe, for instance) could muster armed followers and provide defense in place of a state. 14 15 claimed to be distinct from (and perhaps superior to) any state, and in theory at least it was not supposed to employ violence, which it would leave to those political authorities who would do its bidding.
Understanding what happens will require scrutinizing the politics, and it may also mean that we have to look beyond economics and draw upon work by behavioral economists, political scientists, and evolutionary anthropologists.
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Some of the behavior may simply involve imitation (such as coordinating on a particular equilibrium or copying what is widespread) and it may not be the result of optimization. But that is true of much political behavior-even voter turn out in modern democracies (Palfrey and Pogorelskiy 2014) . When analyzing the politics we will Prussia during the reign of Frederick William, or modern democracies. same was likely true of the other states in early modern Europe. And that for warfare there was not simply a matter of providing the public good of defense. Rather, it was at least in part a consumption good for the of kings, and once they were adults and in power their advisers would impossible to divide up via peaceful bargaining.
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Elites with a political voice shared their taste and enthusiasm for war, and both they and the Incentives of that sort are a recipe for overspending on war. Indeed, if a political decision maker (a king or his chief adviser in a monarchy; in a democracy, it would be a president, prime minister, or pivotal member of a representative assembly) avoids the costs of war and reaps a disproporit cannot be prevented by any peaceful transfer of resources (Jackson and -tary spending in Europe to subside in the nineteenth century, after the Napoleonic Wars had changed the underlying rules so that even monarchs could be deposed after a loss and after decision making had passed into the hands of leaders who had not been raised to pursue the glory of war. In this new equilibrium of domestic politics and international relations, Warfare did in fact grow less common in nineteenth-century Europe, but if we look at western Europe and compare the years (the period between the Napoleonic Wars and World War I) with the 21 --tary spending would make it harder for a state to furnish growth enhancing public goods, but they are surprisingly hard to answer, because we lack the necessary data-in particular, disaggregated government spending in other parts of the world. Before the nineteenth century, governments 21 obscure periodicals, and categorizing the spending is not easy. Although spade work for social spending after 1880, data for other categories of nineteenth-century spending still have to be collected. On the other hand, greater democracy does seem to have been correlated with more spending on public goods and services that contribute to economic growth-goods and services such as education, the enforcement of property rights, and public works such as transportation infraon education and public works in France, Spain, and the Netherlands 2011, pp. 110-113). And democracy did spur spending on education,
24-25).
A simple model of a median voter or a pivotal decision maker would that would link steps toward democracy to both an increased ability to money for education and public works was allocated locally. Spending on schools was high in Germany, even though the national government was far from democratic, because local governments made the decisions more local government spending on roads, sewers, and clean water, but the causality did not run in a simple monotonic way from more democ--of getting valuable infrastructure by breaking free of a politics that had been limited to redistributing within the elite (Lizzeri and Persico -against getting sewers and clean water. So if we want to understand what impels governments to spend on growth enhancing public goods and services, we have to pay close attention to the politics and to the history, as has been done for work on education (Goldin and Katz 2008; Lindert 2004) . But much more remains to do. In many cases, we do not even know what total government spending for educational funding has been studied, as has its economic impact. For infrastructure, work on its impact and on the politics behind it are before the late nineteenth century. And there are other growth enhancing -larly the provision of courts or other venues for settling private disputes. economic analysis of their impact is sorely lacking, particularly when it Europe, which imposed uniform rules on the fragmented legal systems of continental Europe.
research usually combined government and private efforts, but we know too little about the economic consequences and the politics behind what the government did. Government action here reached back much further percent of technical innovators in the years between 1820 and 1941 had learned from working for federal or local governments-all well before that learning was likely huge. Any study of the impact of the research-even when it was done by private entrepreneurs-will also have to take into account the effect of adopted to control agricultural pests in nineteenth and twentieth-century -their research into practice. 24 that acted were often local ones. goods and services governments provide. Private actors can build roads by constructing the water system themselves or by operating a governservices to the sort of mercenary armies that were common in Europe and or natural monopolies.
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But even when those problems can be solved, private provision still usually assumes that the state is strong enough to regulate markets, to remake property rights, and to resolve disputes over them. In eighteenth-century France, for instance, it would have been prof-24 (Olmstead and Rhode 2008, pp. 254-6) . 25 solve the problem via private bargaining (Rosenthal 1992) . Reforming the legal system to resolve those problems was politically impossible, for it would have meant changing both property rights and fundamental drastic solution required the French Revolution. Only then did the French state become strong enough to make private provision of drainage and irrigation feasible on a large scale.
was not protection of property rights against a predatory state in eighteenth-century France. Property rights were in fact secure in Old-Regime France-if anything, too secure. Rather, it was the political weakness of revenue relative to the size of their economy than the British, but they could not tamper with the underlying political equilibrium that protected In Britain, by contrast, the state wielded far more power in the eighteenth century. Although it is well known that the Glorious Revolution -Revolution, Parliament alone would henceforth have the power to authocanals to toll roads-that enhanced economic growth. Parliament could also create new local government bodies to provide goods such as water or infrastructure, so that greater private provision could march hand in hand with more public provision too.
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Analyzing the politics is therefore essential for understanding when glance it might seem that simple theory alone could make sense of the One might imagine, for instance, that private provision would simply 26 300-1).
For the many things Parliament did after the Glorious Revolution and the effect on transportation in particular and the British economy in general, see Bogart (2005) , Bogart and Richardson (2011), and Pincus and Robinson (2012) . disappear as the scale of government increased. A simple principal agent model might suggest as much, because a risk averse agent would shun down into small pieces, at some point economies of scale in supervision would make it better for the government to hire multiple agents and pay 28 private provision has not vanished. It is true that large-scale military entrewars and mobilized armies ever since the late Middle Ages (Parrott 2012).
But after a pause from the late eighteenth to the late twentieth century, the military entrepreneurs have come back, with Blackwater being the -tated conscription, from the French Revolution through World War II -alties become unpopular, political leaders had an incentive to adopt a substitutes for ground troops, which could range from atomic weapons to drones. But it could also mean hiring modern mercenaries, as in Iraq.
In any case, we have to analyze the politics and political history to understand why mercenaries have made a comeback in modern democracies and why they were not used heavily in the West between the the United States, the shift from private water companies in the nineteenth century to municipal provision in the twentieth was at least in move back to private water provision in the late twentieth century was 28 Suppose an agent receives a wage payment y plus a share f of the effort x that he puts into cx 2 that is quadratic in his effort and a cost of risk a f s same, cutting its levy on the highest incomes from 98 percent in 1978 to rates about the same (Figure 3 ).
rates that do not vary will bring in the same revenue and yet spare risk differences in their growth rates and growth rates in France and Germany 
